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Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?
Gary Lawson*
(forthcoming N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY)

Abstract
In The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government
(2013), Richard Epstein says that he “incorporates but goes beyond” originalist theory by
calling for adjudication “in sync with” classical liberal theory political theory, which Professor
Epstein claims underlies the Constitution. Without in any way detracting from the numerous
virtues of this book, I argue that this is primarily a work of constitutional construction rather
than constitutional interpretation. From the standpoint of interpretation, the background rules
that best supplement the constitutional text are found in eighteenth-century fiduciary law rather
than in classical liberal political theory, though the latter is relevant in many contexts. From the
standpoint of adjudication, the Constitution implicitly prescribes a set of default rules, rather
than reliance on political theory, to govern in the face of interpretative indeterminacy. Hence,
Professor Epstein’s adjudicative scheme cannot be derived from interpretation of the
Constitution but must result from constitutional construction.

It is a great honor to be invited to comment on Richard Epstein’s magnificent new book
The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government.1 Its
remarkable scope, depth, and profundity handily place it among the leading works in the everburgeoning field of constitutional theory. The fact that no one will be surprised by this

* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This Comment was prepared in connection with a
conference on February 10, 2014 at New York University School of Law. I am grateful to the N.Y.U. Journal of
Law and Liberty and the Classical Liberal Institute for inviting me and to Professor Richard Epstein for providing
me with more than 30 years of inspiration.
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GOVERNMENT (2014).
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achievement2 should make us work harder not to diminish it; Richard Epstein is a national
treasure who is dangerously easy to take for granted.
Characteristically, the book sweeps broadly, addressing issues from standing to executive
power to due process to freedom of religion. It aims to be a comprehensive account of American
constitutionalism. In a work so panoramic, in which the focus is on explaining the political
theory underlying the Constitution (and the countervailing political theory underlying the
Constitution’s effective demise as an operational document), even almost 600 pages of text leave
relatively little room to deal with matters of interpretative theory. Yet in barely more than a
dozen pages,3 Professor Epstein manages to lay out a rigorous theory of constitutional
interpretation, and it is on that aspect of the book that I will focus my attention. That narrow
focus should not obscure the importance of the remaining 567 pages of the work, all of which
merit careful attention and profound respect and any portion of which would justify a lengthy
comment.
Professor Epstein contests – or at the very least says that he “incorporates but goes
beyond”4 – two of the leading contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation: originalism
and living constitutionalism.5 Obviously, neither he nor I think this choice exhausts the range of
preferred constitutional methodologies. In particular, pragmatism,6 eclecticism,7 perfectionism,8

2

I was recently part of a conversation involving identification of the five smartest people with whom one has ever
been in a room. Richard Epstein’s name figured prominently in that conversation.
3

See id. at 45-56, 68-71. See also id. at 570-83 (reinforcing many of the themes in the foregoing pages).

4

Id. at 45.

5

See id.

6

See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1996).
7

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787-96 (1997).
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and common law constitutionalism9 quickly leap to mind as prominent alternatives. But time
and space are scarce resources, and one must choose one’s targets. Because I defend a species of
originalism, the merits vel non of living constitutionalism or any methodologies not addressed by
Professor Epstein are not pertinent to this Comment. I am fairly confident that Professor Epstein
and I would largely agree on the inadequacy, though not necessarily on all of the reasons for the
inadequacy, of all of these other modes of interpretation. Instead, the relatively modest, but
nonetheless important, disagreement with Professor Epstein on which I want to focus concerns
whether originalism can carry all of the necessary interpretative water without a supplementing
framework drawn from classical liberal political theory. With one very important qualification,
described at the conclusion of this Comment, I think that it can.
Part I of this Comment describes Professor Epstein’s interpretative theory, sets forth the
difference between theories of interpretation and theories of adjudication (sometimes framed as
the difference between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction), and explores
the extent to which Professor Epstein is presenting one or the other kind of theory. Part II
analyzes the interpretative component of Professor Epstein’s project, concluding that he is right
that originalist interpretation requires background rules to be effective as an interpretative theory
but doubting that classical liberalism, rather than eighteenth-century fiduciary law, is the primary
source of those background rules. Part III examines Professor Epstein’s adjudicative theory,
which calls for constitutional adjudication “in sync with”10 classical liberal political principles,
suggesting that, while this approach may be normatively attractive as a constitutional

8

See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006).

9

See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).

10

EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53-54.
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construction, the Constitution itself implicitly prescribes a very different set of adjudicative
principles.

I

“What rules and techniques of interpretation are necessary and proper to grasp the
meaning of any constitutional text?”11 Professor Epstein breaks this “disarmingly simple
question”12 into two parts. The first part seeks the correct interpretative answer as a matter of
first principles.13 The second asks how previous interpretative efforts – and specifically previous
interpretations that are erroneous as a matter of first principles – should affect present
interpretations.14
With respect to first principles, Professor Epstein takes the original public meaning of the
constitutional text as the starting point for interpretation,15 thereby rejecting – as do most (though
not quite all) modern originalists – reliance on the subjective intentions of the original
constitutional drafters, whoever that term may be understood to encompass.16 But he maintains
11

Id. at 45.

12

Id.

13

See id.

14

See id. Obviously, a key premise of this breakdown is that previous interpretations are not determinative of
meaning as a matter of first principles. Advocates of some species of “common law constitutionalism” might be
tempted to dispute this premise, but those advocates are typically setting forth theories of adjudication or
governance rather than theories of meaning.
15

See id. at 46.

16

A significant block of originalist scholars continues to focus, at least to some degree, on historically concrete
intentions. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Richard S. Kay, Adhering to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 226 (1988);
Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1239 (2007).
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that this starting point requires many important extensions and elaborations in order to provide
an adequate account of constitutional meaning. Among the most prominent of Professor
Epstein’s elaborating propositions are:
(1) Some constitutional provisions contain technical words of art that require background
knowledge to understand.17
(2) Other provisions involve “grand abstractions” that can be grasped only through
“explicit resort to the dominant political theory” that underlies the document.18
(3) Constitutional provisions cannot be viewed in isolation from the structural whole.19
(4) Once one has identified the apparent original public meaning, one must ask “whether
the text as written is subject to a set of unspoken qualifications that either supplement
or restrict its application.”20
(5) Those unspoken qualifications most notably include an anti-circumvention principle
to prevent governmental actors from “skirting a constitutional norm without violating
its literal meaning,”21 a set of police powers that provide justifications for
governmental actions that appear to violate unqualified textual provisions,22 and the
judicial provision of remedies for constitutional violations.23

17

EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 46.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 46-47.

20

Id. at 47.

21

Id. at 48-49.

22

Id. at 49.

23

Id. at 50.
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(6) Interpretation undertaken pursuant to these unspoken qualifications frequently “leads
to a constant balancing of interests to take into account the justifications that might be
offered for an admitted restriction on a constitutional right.”24
(7) This interpretative enterprise, including the dialectical movement from anticircumvention norms to police power justifications to remedies and back again, must
be conducted “in light of supplemental norms that arise from within th[e] classical
liberal tradition,”25 because “[i]n its enduring provisions, our Constitution is most
emphatically a classical liberal document.”26
Once the correct answer as a matter of principle has been determined by the foregoing
method, Professor Epstein allows certain past errors to take precedence over that meaning. The
determination of which errors have that kind of prescriptive (in the property law sense of the
term) effect “does not admit any standard interpretive answer.”27 Rather, “powerful value
judgments have to work themselves into the system, to ask whether the rejection of wellestablished doctrine will advance or harm the position of the nation as a whole.”28
This is a remarkably rich interpretative theory to be set forth in such a short space, and
nothing that I say here should detract from the sheer awe with which I regard Professor Epstein’s
ability to pack enormous ideas into a manageable package. But I was invited to this conference
to comment on (read: criticize) Professor Epstein’s constitutional methodology, so here we go.

24

Id. at 54.

25

Id. at 53.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 70.

28

Id.
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Focusing on the task of discerning meaning from the standpoint of first principles,
propositions (1) and (3) would be accepted by everyone. The remaining propositions lay out a
more controversial method that places heavy reliance on political theory. The big question is: a
controversial method for doing what? The seemingly obvious answer is: “for interpreting the
Constitution.” But, on reflection, it is not at all clear that this seemingly obvious answer is
correct. It is not at all clear, in other words, that this book is really meant to be about
constitutional interpretation.
It is now standard in the literature on constitutional theory to distinguish constitutional
interpretation from constitutional construction.29 The former “is the activity that discerns the
communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text.”30 The latter is defined by
one leading theorist as “the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine and the
legal effect of the constitutional text,”31 by another leading theorist as “implementing and
applying the Constitution using all of the various modalities of interpretation,”32 and by yet
another as “the activity of applying . . . meaning to particular factual circumstances.”33 I would
use slightly different terminology to distinguish between the activities of constitutional

29

The interpretation/construction distinction is widely attributed to Keith Whittington, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-2 (1999), though the
distinction between ascertaining the meaning of a text and deciding how to apply the text in action is ancient.
30

Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 457 (2013). It is
not at all clear that communicative content and linguistic meaning are precisely the same thing if one considers
certain pragmatic features of communication to be outside the boundaries of “linguistic meaning.” See id. at 464-65.
I use the term “meaning” to describe communicative content, including its pragmatic elements.
31

Id.

32

JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4 (2011).

33

Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011).
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interpretation and constitutional adjudication.34 That is, interpretation is the ascertainment of
the communicative signals contained in a text, while construction is the production of norms for
real-world decision-making – i.e., adjudication -- undertaken pursuant to (or in the name of) the
text. The two activities need not be related to each other at all, and if they are related, that
relationship is contingent. The activity of interpretation is a positive rather than normative
activity: one is seeking to determine objective facts about the communicative signals conveyed
by a text.35 The activity of adjudication or construction is normative: one is seeking to determine
the proper course of action in a real-world setting.36 The two are related only if one determines,
as a normative matter, that the proper course of action in any particular circumstance is to act in
accordance with the communicative signals contained in the interpreted text. And that is a
34

See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823 (1997). I have
developed this distinction at greater length elsewhere. See Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy .
. . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1555-56 (2012); Gary Lawson,
Originalism without Obligation, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1309, 1312-15 (2013). Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh have recently
urged that nestled in between theories of interpretation and theories of adjudication stand theories of law, and that
distinguishing theories of law from theories of adjudication better isolates the key issues in constitutional (or at least
originalist constitutional) theory. See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism
from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013). I suspect they are right to maintain that many
originalists are implicitly – and sometimes explicitly -- articulating theories of law, see, e.g, Randy E. Barnett, The
Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 417-18 (2013); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994), and to the extent that
Professors Berman and Toh are trying to describe the landscape of modern originalist theory, there appears to be
much to their position. For myself (and Professors Berman and Toh are right to characterize my position as
“idiosyncratic,” Berman & Toh, supra, at 548 n.16), I am not prepared to say categorically that originalism is a way
to determine the law, because I incline towards a natural-law metaphysics. Cf. Mark Greenberg, Legislation As
Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (distinguishing the communicative
content of a statute from its contribution to the content of law). A properly formulated natural law theory could look
in practice much like a positivist theory in which the original meaning of the Constitution might play a role -- but
that is a topic for another day.
35

See Barnett, supra note 34, at 415.

36

Just to be clear: I do not adhere to a hard Humean distinction between facts and values. Quite to the contrary, I
believe that there are proper norms of human conduct that are grounded in actual facts about people and the world in
which they live. See, e.g., TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES: A STUDY OF LIFE AS THE ROOT AND REWARD OF
MORALITY (2000). But those facts are of a different kind than facts about the meaning of a text. The techniques for
discerning communicative signals in the Constitution will not necessarily yield good information about proper moral
conduct, no more than they will necessarily yield good information about quantum mechanics or how to make an
omelet.
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determination that can only be made through moral theory; interpretative theory is not suited for
addressing that kind of question, no more than is astronomy, philology, or forensic science.
Nothing in originalism as a theory of ascertaining meaning entails, or even suggests, that
real-world decisions should be made in accordance with that ascertained meaning, and nothing in
originalism as a theory of adjudication entails, or even suggests, that originalism is correct as an
interpretative theory. In the latter case, for example, one could perfectly well think that
originalism is the right way to decide real-world cases even if one believes that originalism is the
wrong way to discern communicative signals, perhaps because one thinks that originalism yields
results that are normatively superior to those derived from a more “correct” interpretative
method, better fits some sense of the institutional role of various actors, or yields adequate
answers at a more reasonable cost than other methods that might in theory be more reliable.
Similarly, one could believe that originalism is the best (or even, as do I, the uniquely correct)
method for ascertaining the Constitution’s communicative signals but reject it as a tool for
decisionmaking, for any or all of the kinds of reasons given above. One could certainly conclude
that originalism is the correct tool for both interpretation and adjudication, but those conclusions
are logically independent and must be validated by very different chains of reasoning.37
Thus, the preliminary question for this Comment is whether Professor Epstein is trying to
ascertain the communicative signals in the Constitution or trying to prescribe a course of conduct
for governmental actors. Obviously, he is doing both to some extent. Professor Epstein’s
discussion of precedent, for example, is entirely geared towards adjudication rather than
interpretation, as it describes circumstances in which real-world adjudication should turn on
something other than ascertained constitutional meaning. He is not claiming, as some common-

37

See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 400 (2013).
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law constitutionalists might claim, that precedents serve as sources of meaning as a matter of
first principles. His primary discussion of first-principle determination of meaning is more
ambiguous about its goals. Propositions (1)-(3) above all seem aimed at identifying the factual
meaning of the document. Propositions (4)-(7), on the other hand, all seem aimed primarily at
prescribing rules for adjudicative actors, though they could also be seen as attempts to flesh out
communicative meaning. At some points, Professor Epstein writes as though his entire
framework is aimed at identifying the appropriate background rules for discerning the
Constitution’s communicative content.38 At other times, however, the elaborating propositions
are justified as necessary “to ensure that constitutional interpretation produces workable and
sensible results in light of the overall design and purpose of the contested provision,”39 which is
a normative argument that sounds in adjudicative rather than interpretative theory.
This academic gobbledy-gook is important because if Professor Epstein is making a
normative case for a particular kind of adjudicative theory, then I have nothing useful to say
about it. One can only usefully comment on normative arguments in normative terms, and for
more than a quarter century, I have striven very hard to avoid congesting the law reviews with
normative observations that are not validated by foundationally sound arguments.40 As it
happens, I am largely sympathetic to Professor Epstein’s normative position, but there is no
particular reason why anyone should find that fact intellectually interesting.
Accordingly, I am going to proceed for the moment – perhaps incorrectly -- as though
Professor Epstein intends his interpretative methodology to be the appropriate tool for discerning
38

See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 50-51.

39

Id. at 47.

40

For a brief personal history on this point, see Gary Lawson, Truth, Justice, and the Libertarian Way(s), B.U.L.
REV. 1347, 1347-48 (2011). To be clear: I do not sit in judgment of others who feel freer to share normative views
that are not foundationally grounded. I am simply not intellectually comfortable doing it.

10

constitutional meaning. Of course, as was already noted, much of Professor Epstein’s project is
explicitly about adjudication rather than interpretation. As it happens, the Constitution purports
– albeit indirectly -- to give directions to adjudicative actors, and so after discussing
interpretative theory, I will subsequently, in Part III, describe (without prescribing) the methods
of adjudication indicated by the Constitution’s original meaning and show how those methods
differ from Professor Epstein’s adjudicative model. Because Professor Epstein’s adjudicative
model cannot be derived from the Constitution itself, it operates as a construction rather than an
interpretation of the Constitution. It is a simply splendid construction that I hope gets widely
adopted by real-world actors, but it is a construction nonetheless. For the moment, however, let
us turn to the ascertainment of constitutional meaning.

II

Professor Epstein is absolutely right that naked textualism is an ineffective method for
discerning the Constitution’s communicative signals.41 All communication takes place in a
context, and without knowing the context, the communication cannot be understood. Precisely
the same words, even within a single language,42 can have very different meanings if they are
embedded in an instruction manual, a contract, a poem, a diary, a coded message, or a satirical
play. One can certainly give meaning to words independently of the context in which they were
uttered or written, just as one can give meaning to spilled goat entrails or a random collection of

41

See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 54.

42

“A short string of characters may correspond to a word in more than one language; for instance, ‘chair’
means chair in English, while in French it means flesh.” Sherri Irvin, Authors, Intentions and Literary Meaning, 1
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 114, 114 (2006).
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star patterns, but then one is giving rather than ascertaining meaning. The very notion of
ascertaining the meaning of a communication requires trying to understand what is being
communicated and by whom, even if the communicator is oneself.43
The real question is: whose intentions determine communicative meaning in the context
of the Constitution? Professor Epstein is right to reject reliance on the concrete, historical
intentions of any particular set of drafters of the Constitution, but he is right for somewhat
different reasons than he offers. Professor Epstein cites as the “great advantage” of reference to
public meaning over private intentions that “the interpreter is far more likely to find a single
standard meaning from reading the text than from attempting to reconcile the various separate
understandings of draftsmen in the plural.”44 This is not a reason that makes sense from the
standpoint of an objective search for interpretative truth; a single discernible but wrong answer is
not necessarily “better” in this respect than a cacophony of answers or no answer at all. It does,
however, make some sense as a matter of adjudicative theory if one assumes that effective
adjudication requires adjudicators to have a single discernible meaning to apply -- which is one
more piece of evidence that Professor Epstein is at all points in his argument weaving an
adjudicative rather than an interpretative theory, but let that pass. As I will explain later, this
assumption that effective constitutional adjudication requires a single definitive constitutional
meaning in every instance is false, but it is a widely shared, and even standard, assumption, and
it is accordingly quite reasonable -- even if ultimately mistaken -- for Professor Epstein to make
it. But even if it provided a good reason as a matter of adjudicative theory for choosing objective
over subjective meaning as the ground for constitutional interpretation, it would not satisfy the
43

See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?”: Why Intention Free
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).
44

EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 46.
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requirements of determining meaning as a matter of first principle. The interpretative reasons
for choosing objective over subjective meaning must relate to the superiority of one over the
other as an accurate method for discerning communicative signals in a given context. Any other
kind of argument is beside the point.
Guy Seidman and I have elsewhere sketched the interpretative case for making the locus
of constitutional meaning the understandings that would have been held by a hypothetical
reasonable person at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.45 Importantly, we do not reach that
conclusion by starting with the reader as the locus of meaning. Although that is how Professor
Seidman and I initially presented the role of the reasonable person in constitutional
interpretation,46 that was shorthand for an argument that we did not formally develop until 2006.
Communicative meaning must be grounded in the intentions of the communicator, even if those
intentions are necessarily shaped by the presumed expectations of readers, and even if those
intentions are best understood -- as will often be the case, and perhaps even generally be the case
where honest attempts at communication are involved47 -- as the abstract intention to put out
utterances that will then be given a public meaning by the reader.48 But at the most basic level, if

45

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). I
plan to develop the case in much greater depth in a forthcoming work.
46

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 25
(2001).
47

Andrei Marmor correctly reminds us that legal statements are not always honest attempts at communication; they
can be attempts at manipulation or evasion. See Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some
Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 34,
at 93-94. The Constitution presents itself as an honest attempt at communication, though to defend that proposition
would require an extensive argument, which I will offer in a subsequent work.
48

See Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597,
598 (2013).
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you are not trying to understand what someone is saying, you are not engaged in the enterprise of
communication.49
The key is to identify the author of the Constitution who is attempting to communicate.
The Constitution itself provides the answer by declaring that its effective author – the entity
whose intentions determine its communicative content -- is “We the People,”50 which is a
hypothetical construct rather than a concrete, intending person. The effective author of a legal
document must be distinguished from the literal author. The literal author of the Constitution
could plausibly be identified as the thirty nine signatories to the document, all of the people at
the Constitutional Convention, all of the people at the various ratifying conventions, all of the
people who chose to recognize the Constitution as authoritative, or any subset thereof (such as
the Committee of Detail). But just as the effective author of a form power of attorney is the
principal who propounds it rather than the anonymous employee of the publishing firm that
literally typed the words, and the effective author of a will is the person whose estate is being
distributed rather than the lawyer who actually crafted the plan, so the effective author of the
Constitution is the entity that ordained and established it as a legal document.51 The Constitution
itself identifies that entity as the hypothetical “We the People.”52

49

See RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., INTENTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING 42 (1999) (“understanding the
meaning of what another person says (or writes or creates) demands some recognition of that person's
communicative intentions, even if we sometimes infer meanings different from that person's intended messages”).
50

See U.S. CONST. Preamble.

51

Cf. GIBBS, supra note 49, at 220 (“I might even purchase a birthday card from a local store, present this to a
friend, and claim authorship of the sentiments expressed in the card simply because I signed and sent the card to a
particular person, even if as ‘author’ I am not historically connected to the person who wrote the text”).
52

See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 45, at 58-61. To be very clear: This is not a claim about actual political
authority. We are not saying that “We the People” managed to create any kind of legal or political obligations on
anyone. We are saying only that, for purposes of interpretation, the putative author of the Constitution is “We the
People.”
Couldn’t one say instead that the Constitution’s effective author is the state ratifying conventions, because their
ratification gave the Constitution legal effect? See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of
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Moreover, when the literal author of a document is more than one person, the actual
metaphysics of intentions require that the joint product be treated as though it was written by a
single person or entity. Each joint author must, in other words, intend at some level that the
work product be understood as the result of a hypothetical “author” who does not necessarily
reflect the precise thoughts of any of the concrete individuals involved.53 Thus, Professor
Epstein is right that a multiplicity of drafters requires looking beyond individual intentions – but
he is right from the standpoint of interpretative theory rather than adjudicative theory.
Constructing the intentions of this hypothetical “We the People,” understanding that term
to represent a single hypothetical intending entity, roughly correlates with discerning the
objective public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its adoption, given that “We the
People” is both the author of and the (primary) intended audience for the act of communication
represented by the document.54 To be sure, the hypothetical “We the People” is not the exclusive
intended audience for the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause makes clear that at least part of
the audience for the Constitution is real-world, concrete state court judges, who are specifically
instructed to give the Constitution hierarchical priority in adjudication,55 and the Oath Clause
makes clear that the audience also includes “[t]he Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
Nothing of substance would change about the proper interpretation of the Constitution if that were true (because the
ratifying conventions are hypothetical entities in their own rights), but the answer is no. Article VII specifies the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain legal and political event, but that event involves the establishment
as governing law of “this” Constitution. In other words, the content of the document had already been determined
(by virtue of its being ordained and established) before its Article VII “Establishment” as law took place. In 1788,
the Constitution had the same meaning in Rhode Island and North Carolina as it had in New Hampshire and
Connecticut, and it would have had the same meaning had it been defeated at five ratifying conventions.
53

See id. at 61-67.

54

See id. at 70-73.

55

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

15

Officers, both of the United States and of the several States.”56 Moreover, the instrument might
well be of interest to, for example, foreign courts that must in some circumstances apply
American law, to foreign scholars doing comparative work, or perhaps to people seeking
American citizenship who are not yet part of We the People. But the primary audience for We
the People’s communication is We the People. Accordingly, the best understanding of
constitutional meaning must represent the intentions of We the People seeking to communicate
with, among other entities, We the People.57 That is a good approximation of Professor
Epstein’s public meaning theory of constitutional interpretation.
Professor Epstein is also right that the bare text of the Constitution cannot be the whole
story as to its meaning.58 Texts require contexts. The interpretation of any text requires
background rules for interpretation that authors – real or hypothetical -- simply will not have the
time, or possibly the inclination, to specify and that must be taken for granted. (And any explicit
specifications would themselves have to be interpreted in light of some set of background
principles.) Professor Epstein finds those background principles for interpreting the Constitution
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in “the general [classical liberal] theory that animates the text,”59 and thus concludes that the
Constitution’s “successful interpretation on all points dealing with text and its surrounding norms
should be read in sync with the tradition of strong property rights, voluntary association, and
limited government.”60 This claim is part of a theory of interpretation rather than a theory of
construction or adjudication to the extent that it purports to provide the context against which the
communicative signals of the document must be understood.
There is no doubt that Professor Epstein at least partly has this interpretative focus in
mind, and there is no doubt that he is at least partly right. There are specific clauses in the
Constitution that rather plainly owe their provenance in large measure to classical liberalism (and
I believe that at one time Professor Epstein claimed no more than this for classical liberal
theory). It is difficult to understand the Take Care Clause61 without reference to the Glorious
Revolution and its opposition to monarchical suspension of the laws. Article I and its list of
enumerated powers reads very differently if one starts with the organic theory of the state rather
than with the distinctively American eighteenth-century conception of limited government.
Classical liberal political theory is part of the interpretative background of the Constitution in a
way that, for example, Marxism simply is not. When the Fifth Amendment refers to “private
property,”62 the term includes the means of production and not simply small personal articles.
But that is not enough to make the Constitution “The” classical liberal Constitution, in
the sense that the entire document must be read, in all of its particulars, to conform to (be “in
sync with”) classical liberal theory. That would be true if and only if classical liberal political
59
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theory was either the only relevant background principle of interpretation or had hierarchical
priority over all other relevant background principles. And that is surely not the case. Indeed, at
least one other background principle can claim interpretative priority over classical liberal theory
in the event of a conflict.
How one interprets a document is a function of what kind of document it is. The
background principles of interpretation are quite different for a poem than for a treatise on early
English land law, even when both documents are written in the same language at the same point
in time. One cannot interpret, in the sense of ascertaining the communicative signals contained
in, the Constitution without knowing what kind of document one is interpreting.
Professor Epstein, as I understand him, agrees with this and, indeed, sees the Constitution
as being one among a large class of legal instruments that share basic interpretative premises.
Hence, he writes that “[t]he proper way to read a constitutional provision scarcely differs from
the proper way to interpret other documents with legal effect: statutes, regulations, and
contracts.”63
It is absolutely true that the Constitution’s character as a legal document determines to a
large extent the appropriate background rules of interpretation; it suggests, for example, that one
should not be on the lookout for metaphors or onomatopoeia, as one might be when reading a
poem or play,64 and that one should instead be on the lookout for technical words of art that have
specialized meaning in the law. But the Constitution is not exactly like a statute, a regulation, or
a contract (assuming, as I think is probably right, that those three entities have enough in
common to be lumped together). It is a legal document, to be sure, but it belongs to a specific
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class of legal documents that has – or, more pertinently, had in the late eighteenth century – its
own distinctive principles of interpretation within the wider category of legal instruments.
Elsewhere, Rob Natelson (to whom is due virtually all of the credit for this crucial idea),
Guy Seidman, and I develop at some length the proposition that the Constitution is, as James
Iredell called it at the North Carolina ratifying convention, “a great power of attorney,”65 and
thus must be understood in light of the principles of interpretation governing eighteenth-century
fiduciary instruments.66 That is, the Constitution is not simply a legal document simpliciter, a
superstatute, or a special kind of treaty or compact. The Constitution is fundamentally an agency
instrument, in which the principal, “We the People,” entrusts some measure of power over its
affairs to a set of agents. This is not a claim about political theory suggesting that the
Constitution actually worked, in some normatively binding fashion, an effective transfer of
power. This is purely a descriptive claim about the kind of document that the Constitution is and
accordingly about the appropriate background principles of interpretation that bear upon it.
Without repeating in full the lengthy argument for this characterization of the
Constitution: The Constitution’s text, structure, and history all suggest that Iredell was right, at
least in broad-brush terms, about the appropriate characterization of the document. The
Constitution most naturally reads like a grant of power from a principal (the “We the People”
identified in the Preamble) to agents (federal officials and, to a very limited extent, state
officials) to manage some portion of the principal’s affairs – which is not at all surprising in a
document primarily drafted by four agency lawyers (Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, James
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Rutledge, and James Wilson) and a businessperson who routinely employed agents (Nathaniel
Gorham).67 The Constitution is structured in much the same way as were other kinds of
eighteenth-century fiduciary instruments.68 The founding generation widely understood the
Constitution, and government in general, in fiduciary terms.69 Certain portions of the
Constitution, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, make sense only in light of eighteenthcentury fiduciary norms and understandings.70 Chief Justice Marshall’s classic opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland71 took for granted the fiduciary character of the instrument.72 If the
Constitution is not literally “a great power of attorney,” it is something very close to it.
This is not the place to spin out the interpretative consequences of viewing the
Constitution as a fiduciary instrument. That would require a book (which Mr. Natelson,
Professor Seidman, and I are planning). For now, it is enough to point out that the background
principles for interpretation that Professor Epstein and I both agree are necessary in order to
understand the communicative signals conveyed by the constitutional text can be found most
naturally in a source other than classical liberal political theory. The best place to look for
principles for interpreting an agency instrument is the set of principles for interpreting agency
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instruments. Eighteenth-century agency law as applied to the public realm is the first recourse
for understanding the United States Constitution.
That does not mean that classical liberal political theory is irrelevant. As noted above,
some constitutional clauses, such as the Take Care Clause, and terms, such as “private property,”
gain important aspects of their meaning from that background. It does mean, however, that
running the entire Constitution through classical liberal theory to ensure that interpretations are
“in sync with” the main thrust of classical liberalism is an interpretative mistake, though it may
make considerable sense as a piece of constitutional construction. To be sure, it is quite likely
that a straightforward application of what one might call “fiduciary originalism” will track in
large measure the set of interpretative conclusions that one would reach through Professor
Epstein’s method, simply because eighteenth-century agency law concepts were in fact
embedded in a classical liberal political culture. For instance, something like Professor Epstein’s
anti-circumvention principle is quite readily derivable from understanding the Constitution as an
agency instrument. But the correspondence will not necessarily be perfect. The Dormant
Commerce Clause, for example, leaps to mind as something that makes sense under classical
liberal construction73 but not necessarily under fiduciary originalism.74
Professor Epstein asks all of the right interpretative questions, and he answers those
questions from within a fundamentally sound framework concerning the nature of interpretation.
He just picked the wrong set of background principles for interpreting the Constitution. Or so I
think.

73

See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 227-44.

74

See Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

21

III

At least some parts of Professor Epstein’s project – his theory of precedent, for example –
cannot be understood as a theory of interpretation rather than as a theory of adjudication. As an
interpretative matter, I have elsewhere, and somewhat notoriously, expressed the view that the
Constitution forbids the use of precedent to determine its meaning beyond treating precedent as a
source of information about original meaning,75 and I will not revisit that debate here. Instead, I
want to explore the extent to which the Constitution purports to prescribe rules for adjudication
apart from the use of precedent and the extent to which those interpretatively-derived rules are
consistent with Professor Epstein’s classical liberal constitutionalism.
I want to be very clear about the scope and nature of this argument. I am not arguing, as
a normative matter, for any particular approach to constitutional adjudication. Any such claim
would have to be justified by reference to moral theory, and I do not hold myself out as a moral
theorist. Rather, my claim is that if one interprets the Constitution – i.e., discerns the
communicative signals that it contains – one finds instructions, albeit implicit ones, about how to
conduct adjudication under the Constitution. Thus, in the form of a hypothetical imperative: If
one believes that adjudication should be conducted in accordance with the meaning of the
Constitution, that meaning includes very powerful instructions about how to conduct
adjudications.
One set of adjudicatory instructions is quite explicit: The Supremacy Clause tells state
courts that they must decide cases by giving hierarchical preference to certain specified federal
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laws, including the law of the Constitution, in the event of a conflict between those federal norms
and any other source of law:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.76
By its terms, this provision only gives instructions to state courts, and it only tells them to favor
certain federal laws over competing state statutes or constitutions. It does not purport to
command federal officials or state officials other than state judges, and it does not specify that
the Constitution is superior to federal statutes or treaties. But it is not difficult to glean from the
structure and context of the Constitution as a whole an implicit, broader adjudicative principle
that applies to all actors – state or federal, judicial or legislative or executive – and that places
the Constitution hierarchically above all other claimed sources of law, including federal statutes
and treaties. This is the structural argument for constitutional supremacy that John Marshall
made in Marbury v. Madison,77 and it is interpretatively correct.78 This much I suspect is
uncontroversial – at least in its conclusions if not in its reasoning.
But if that is the only set of adjudicative instructions contained in the Constitution, then
there would seem to be a fairly large space for constitutional construction. Suppose one accepts
that the Constitution prescribes its own priority in adjudication. That still leaves the problem of
76
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determining the meaning of the Constitution that needs to be applied in adjudication. Grant for
the moment that fiduciary originalism is the appropriate methodology for determining
constitutional meaning. What happens when fiduciary originalism cannot prescribe a uniquely
correct interpretative answer to a particular question?
One need not spell out a detailed theory of fiduciary originalism to realize that it cannot
possibly claim to prescribe a uniquely correct interpretative answer to every question that arises.
No theory that involves anything more complicated than tossing a coin or having the parties armwrestle for the victory could plausibly claim such a thing. Even if the standard of proof for
constitutional claims is something as low as “better than available alternatives,”79 there will
surely be some set of real-world disputes in which there simply is no good interpretative reason
to prefer one view over another,80 and the set of such disputes grows as the appropriate standard
of proof rises. As Professor Epstein puts it, in at least some cases, such as the precise application
of principles of due process, “even the strongest commitment to an originalist method of
interpretation requires judges [or other interpreters] to engage in subsequent elaboration . . .given
the inability to specify any unique set of procedures for all different cases.”81
This zone of interpretative uncertainty is generally taken as the sphere for constitutional
construction.82 After all, so the argument goes, adjudicators have to decide cases; they cannot
simply throw up their hands and say, “beats us what the Constitution means.” If the correct
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method of interpretation -- in my case fiduciary originalism, but for this purpose the precise
theory does not matter -- cannot provide a uniquely correct answer to interpretative questions,
then something else must fill the gap in adjudication, and that something else must be
constitutional construction. As Professor Epstein explains, “[i]t is idle to argue that this task [of
determining the implicit qualifications of constitutional texts] can be avoided because of the
latent indeterminacy.”83
With all due respect (and where Professor Epstein is concerned, the respect due is almost
incalculable): no, it actually isn’t idle at all. Quite to the contrary, interpretative indeterminacy
fully justifies adjudicators throwing up their hands and saying, “beats us what the Constitution
means.” Such a declaration does not prevent them from deciding cases, and it does not prevent
them from deciding cases in accordance with the Constitution.
I have laid out this argument elsewhere more than once,84 but in brief: When fact-finders
are called upon to resolve disputes, they do not actually have to reach a definitive conclusion
about the facts in order to decide the case. They do not have to settle on a single account of
what happened. Rather, they simply need to find that whichever party bears the burden of proof
on a matter has failed to establish its version of the facts with whatever degree of certainty is
required by the applicable standard of proof. It is perfectly sensible for the fact-finder to throw
up its hands and say, “We have no idea what actually happened, and therefore party X, who bore
the burden of proof on this matter, loses.” A legal system that contains allocations of burdens of
proof, along with accompanying standards of proof that define those burdens, can be entirely
determinate as a matter of adjudication even if it is partly, or even largely, indeterminate as a
83
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matter of factual ascertainment. Successful, determinate adjudication does not require factual
determinacy.
While the American legal system generally (with a few notable exceptions, such as the
Chevron85 doctrine and the “clearly established law” doctrine in official immunity cases86 and
habeas corpus review87) does not use the language of burdens of proof and standards of proof to
describe what happens when legal rather than factual matters are at stake, there is no reason why
it could not do so. It is perfectly sensible for a system of adjudication to say that a case can be
resolved against a party, even without a judicial determination of the applicable law, simply
because the party with the burden of proof has failed to demonstrate, in accordance with the
appropriate standard of proof, that the law has a meaning that entitles that party to a judgment.
Successful adjudication does not require law-finders to specify the precise content of the law any
more than it requires fact-finders to specify a precise account of the facts. It simply requires an
allocation of the burden of proof and specification of a standard of proof. Adjudication can
handle legal indeterminacy just as readily as it can handle factual indeterminacy.
Fine and well, one might say – this is all theoretically possible. But what does that have
to do with the actual Constitution?
Suppose that the Constitution contained an Article VIII that said:

85

The Chevron doctrine is named for Chevron U.S.A.v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), but that is a misnomer, as the doctrine actually has almost nothing to do with the case. For the real story of
the development of the Chevron doctrine, see Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing At All:
The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
86

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). For a brief summary of current law (if one may use the term
loosely) on the subject, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207,
251-57 (2013).
87

See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (2012).

26

In deciding cases under this Constitution, apply the following set of
adjudicative principles. When federal actions are challenged, the initial burden of
proof is placed on whichever party is relying on that federal action for its case to
show that the action is within the enumerated power of the relevant federal
institution(s). If that burden of proof is not met, the party whose case depends on
that exercise of federal power loses. If the federal action prima facie falls within
an enumerated power but is claimed to be invalid because of an affirmative
limitation on federal power external to the enumeration, the party asserting that
affirmative limitation bears the burden of proof and accordingly loses if that
burden is not met and the claim of invalidity is essential to its case. And where
state actions are challenged as inconsistent with the federal Constitution, the party
challenging the state action bears the burden of proof (unless the claim pertains to
a federally enumerated power of a state concerning federal elections or
constitutional amendments) and bears as well the corresponding risk of loss in the
event that the burden is not satisfied. In all instances, the standard of proof for
establishing a relevant legal claim under this Constitution shall be ---.
This provision would specify a set of adjudicative principles that would not require law-finders
actually to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution in order to decide cases. They would
simply need to determine if the party relying on a particular claimed constitutional meaning had
demonstrated that meaning to be correct in accordance with the appropriate standard of proof. A
judgment against that party would not “fix” the meaning of the Constitution in any relevant
sense; it would simply stand as an assessment of the quality of the proof offered by one
particular party. There would be no need for constitutional construction to fill in the meaning of
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constitutional provisions, because it would not be essential to adjudication that the law-finder
settle on any particular meaning.
But, of course, the Constitution contains no such Article VIII. Or does it?
The allocation of burdens of proof described in this hypothetical Article VIII is, I think,
implicit in the actual Constitution. The principle that “he who asserts must prove” is a basic
principle of rational thinking. It therefore serves as a background principle for understanding the
federal Constitution just as surely as do the laws of logic and basic rules of English grammar.
And the fundamental constitutional principle of enumerated federal powers and (with the
possible exception of some matters regarding federal elections and constitutional amendments)
unenumerated state powers establishes the allocations of burdens of proof described in my
Article VIII. Anyone claiming the benefit of an exercise of federal power must be asserting in
the first instance that such power is authorized by the Constitution; otherwise, that exercise of
power has no legal status. The initial burden of proof is thus on whoever is relying on a valid
exercise of federal power, though that burden shifts if the relevant constitutional assertion
involves a claim of an affirmative limitation on a concededly enumerated power. In the case of
challenges to state authority under the federal Constitution, precisely the opposite burden of
proof applies. The person relying on state authority need not, as a federal constitutional matter,
show some affirmative authorization for the state to act (except in a few special cases). The
person challenging state authority as inconsistent with some affirmative federal prohibition is the
relevant constitutional asserter and thus bears the burden of proof. This scheme does not neatly
comport with classical liberal theory, because it sharply distinguishes – as liberal theory would
not – between exercises of governmental power by federal and state actors. In essence, it creates
a presumption against the validity of federal power and in favor of state power. Neither
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Professor Epstein nor I find it normatively attractive to give exercises of state power a
presumption of validity, but that is the result that the Constitution prescribes.88
A scheme for constitutional adjudication without need for definitive determinations of
constitutional meaning is thus implicit in the structure of the Constitution.89
Well, not quite. In order to make this adjudicative scheme work, one needs to know the
standard of proof for claims about constitutional meaning. It is not enough to know who has the
burden of proof; one also needs to know what that person has to do in order to satisfy the burden.
Does the constitutional structure implicitly provide a standard of proof?
I don’t see one. That does not mean that it is not there, but I do not see it. If no such
standard of proof is implicit in the constitutional structure, then there is at least one respect in
which constitutional construction is necessary for successful adjudication: One must select – and
that means select rather than ascertain – the standard of proof for claims about constitutional
meaning. Indeed, there is no obvious reason why there must be a single standard of proof for all
kinds of constitutional claims – no more than there is a single standard of proof for all factual
claims.90
Does classical liberalism have anything to say about the appropriate standard of proof?
Perhaps it does. Classical liberalism starts with a deep suspicion of governmental action,
whether state or federal, and one could conceivably derive from this starting point a set of
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standards of proof that favors the claims of liberty in all cases, along the lines of Randy Barnett’s
“presumption of liberty.”91 Indeed, it is quite possible that Professor Epstein’s entire set of
conclusions about constitutional adjudication could be reached through judicious use of
standards of proof for various claims. If constitutional construction is inevitable, Professor
Epstein’s construction might be able to make a very strong case for primacy among serious
contenders in the modern world. That, however, is a matter for moral theorists about which this
humble law professor has no useful comment.
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